普(Hewlett-Packard)今后的路会怎样？
早 在赫德(Mark Hurd)突然离职之前，这就已经是这家IT巨头面临的问题了。鉴于这位前首席执行长在科技公司NCR的成功任职，他赢得善于运营精简企业的声誉是理所应 当的。他的前任费奥瑞娜(Carly Fiorina)给他留下了成熟的果实等着他来摘。赫德上任之初，惠普的营业利润率只有6%。经过大幅的成本削减之后，截至上个季度，惠普利润率增长了一 倍，至12%。
赫德留下的是一个利润率已经没有太大上升空间的公司，因此提高利润率看起来不像是今后创造股东价值的一个可选方法。这就意味着，赫德的接班人将不得不寻求增长，这对一家销售收入已达1,250亿美元的公司来说是项艰巨的任务。
投 资银行Caris & Co.分析师西赫拉(Robert Cihra)估计，自赫德接管公司以来，惠普的个人电脑业务是大部分收入增长的推动力。不过，该业务的营业利润率只有5%。过去两个季度里，惠普的份额一 直被亚洲竞争对手联想集团(Lenovo Group)和宏 (Acer)所挤占──宏 赢得份额的速度则更快。
西赫拉估计，惠普居市场 领先地位的打印业务创造了17%的强劲利润率，不过增长却只有3%。对惠普的服务业务来说也是如此，在惠普收购了电子数据系统公司(Electronic Data Systems)之后，该业务成了惠普的一大部分，利润率为16%，而增长只有2%。
赫 德在任之际正在实现增长上进行投资，扩大惠普的销售团队，同时收购网络设备公司3Com和手机生产商Palm。理论上讲，这两家公司看起来都像是不错的收 购对象。不过，相对于惠普巨大的收入基础来说，这两家公司都相对较小。尽管3Com扩大了惠普面向数据中心的产品（这是一个吸引人的领域），它的销售却令 惠普总销售额仅仅增加了1%。而Palm在智能手机市场则面临着激烈的竞争。
据汤森路透(Thomson Reuters)的数据，在赫德离职引发惠普股价大跌8%之后，惠普市盈率为九倍（根据2011年预期收益）。这个价位低于英特尔(Intel，10 倍)、微软(Microsoft，11倍)等成熟的大型股技术公司，也低于最接近的竞争对手国际商业机器公司(IBM，11倍)。这样的差距可能是有道理 的：惠普众多的业务使之比这些公司更难管理，不过这一点还有争议。为弥补差距，使股价重回每股50美元，惠普可能需要用另外一个运营高手替代赫德。
不过，将股价提高到这个价位以上需要任何人都难以实现的强劲增长。最大的风险可能是，赫德的继任者试图在收购领域进行大手笔交易，比如开出过高的价格买下一个时髦的软件公司。
对投资者来说，不幸的是惠普看起来处于一个可能没有出路的战略死胡同。
Where does Hewlett-Packard go from here?
That question faced the IT behemoth even before Mark Hurd's sudden departure. The ex-CEO's reputation for running a lean machine was well-deserved, given his successful tenure at NCR. Predecessor Carly Fiorina left him ripe fruit to pick. H-P's operating margins were just 6% when Hurd took the reins. With heavy cost-cutting, he doubled them to 12% as of last quarter.
Mr. Hurd leaves behind a tight ship so juicing margins doesn't look like an option to create shareholder value from here. That means Mr. Hurd's successor will have to look for growth, a tough proposition for a firm already generating $125 billion in sales.
Caris & Co. analyst Robert Cihra estimates that H-P's PC business has driven most revenue growth since Mr. Hurd took over. But operating margins in that business are just 5%. And in the last two quarters, H-P has been losing share to Asian rivals Lenovo Group, and Acer at a faster clip.
H-P's market-leading printing business generates solid 17% margins, but growth is a sluggish 3%, estimates Mr. Cihra. The same is true of its services business, which became a big part of H-P's business with the acquisition of Electronic Data Systems: 16% margins but just 2% growth.
Mr. Hurd was investing in growth, expanding H-P's sales force while acquiring network-equipment company 3Com and mobile-device company Palm. On paper, the two look like decent acquisitions. But both are small relative to H-P's giant revenue base. While 3Com expands H-P's offering for data centers, an attractive area, its sales add just 1% to H-P's total. Palm faces intense competition in the smartphone market.
After the 8% selloff triggered by Mr. Hurd's departure, H-P trades at nine times expected fiscal 2011 earnings, according to Thomson Reuters. That is cheaper than mature megacap technology peers like Intel (10 times), Microsoft (11 times), and nearest rival International Business Machines (11 times). The discount may be deserved: H-P's agglomeration of businesses arguably makes it harder to manage than these companies. To close the gap, which would get the shares back to $50, H-P probably needs to replace Mr. Hurd with another operations guru.
But moving the shares higher than that requires a compelling growth story that would be tough for anyone to deliver. The biggest risk could be that Mr. Hurd's successor tries to make a splash on the acquisition front, overpaying for a fashionable software business, for instance.
Unfortunately for investors, H-P looks to be in a strategic cul-de-sac from which there may be no exit.