Research by Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, two Russian investigative journalists who specialise in covering the security services, reveals a picture of near-total surveillance, Soldatov said.
The Russian authorities have gone to great lengths to lay on the best communications support any Olympic event has seen at the February games, including 4G coverage and free WiFi throughout the city of Sochi.
But Soldatov and Borogan's research indicates that the internet, telephone and other communications providers involved are obliged to build networks in such a way that the security services have full and unimpeded access.
“There is an element of meta-data gathering, but Russian security services are not so interested in meta-data. This is about content,” Soldatov told The Telegraph, citing an “information security concept” document laying out these measures. “The idea seems to be to make communications in Sochi totally transparent for the Russian authorities.”
The monitoring programme, which is run by the Federal Security Service, Russia’s internal security agency and the main successor to the KGB, is aided by software that helps identify key words and phrases of interest being used in electronic communications. “It is a very useful way of knowing who in a given region is talking about Navalny, for example,” said Soldatov, referring to a Russian opposition leader.
An FSB statement and other documents also revealed that the FSB and the Russian interior ministry have both acquired two kinds of drones for surveillance during the games, he added, as well as a vast network of closed circuit television in the city.
While the measures bear some resemblance to security at the Beijing Olympics, Soldatov said that taken together it is probably the most comprehensive surveillance in Olympic history. Drones had been considered for surveillance at the London Olympics, but were not used in the event.
Soldatov said the depth of surveillance was so comprehensive that the US State Department has advised its citizens “that it would be better to forget your laptop or smart phone in your home country, because it will be intercepted.”
The measures are ostensibly aimed at securing Sochi against possible terrorist attacks during the games. Sochi neighbours Russia’s turbulent North Caucasus, where federal forces are fighting a long-running Islamist separatist insurgency. Doku Umarov, a rebel leader who has claimed responsibility for a number of suicide bombings in Moscow in recent years, has called on his followers to attack the games.
In August Vladimir Putin signed a decree establishing restricted zones around the city and banning public demonstrations for the duration of the game.
Earlier this week an FSB spokesman told reporters that security would be unintrusive compared to the London Olympics.
But Soldatov said the nature of the measures and key personnel appointments suggested other priorities.
The chief of Olympic Security, for example, is Oleg Syromolotov, the head of FSB Counter Intelligence – a spy catcher rather than a counter terrorism expert.
“Taken together, it looks to me like these people still see the main threat to the Olympics coming not from the North Caucasus, but from outside the country,” said Soldatov.
The research, part of a joint investigation with the Guardian newspaper, is part of a wider project looking at Russian surveillance practices.
The research is not yet complete and the full report has yet to be published, Soldatov said.
No one at the FSB was immediately available to comment on Sunday evening.
10月6日，2014年索契冬奥会圣火由雅典抵达莫斯科。当天下午，伴随着俄罗斯国歌，俄总统普京手持火炬点燃红场火炬台后致辞：“俄罗斯和俄罗斯人民一直秉承开放、友好的优秀品质，索契是举办奥运会的理想地点。”
然而种种迹象显示，俄罗斯尤其是索契，并没有普京口中所说的如此开放：冬奥会期间，在索契这个黑海海滨城市，将建立起奥运史上最全面的监控网络，以至于美国国务院建议国民前往索契观看冬奥会时，把智能手机和笔记本电脑留在家中，防止个人信息外泄。
***监控网络“几乎完全覆盖”
俄罗斯调查记者安德烈•索尔达托夫和伊琳娜•博罗甘专攻安全服务领域报道。两人查阅多份政府采购文件、采访参与索契冬奥会项目招标的通信公司后发现，俄罗斯政府正在索契构筑一张“几乎完全覆盖”的监控网络。
自获得2014年冬季奥运会举办权后，俄 罗斯当局一直不遗余力地向举办城市索契提供最好的通信支持，其中包括在当地实现4G通信网络和免费无线网络全覆盖。但是，索尔达托夫和博罗甘的调查结果显 示，参与索契冬奥会项目的互联网、电话和其他通讯提供商不得不采取一种特别的方式，即保证俄罗斯安全机构享有充分的、畅通无阻的访问权限，来构建其通讯网 络。
“其中包括元数据收集，但俄罗斯安全机构对元数据并不是特别感兴趣，他们感兴趣的是内容。”索尔达托夫引用一份“信息安全概念”文件向英国《每日电讯报》阐述俄罗斯安全机构采取的措施，“他们的想法似乎是，令索契的通讯对俄罗斯当局完全透明。”
据悉，这个监控项目是由俄罗斯联邦安全局 （FSB）负责运营，使用一种软件帮助识别他们关注的、在电子通讯中使用的关键字和短语。索尔达托夫举例说：“如果想要在某个特定区域，知道谁在谈论纳瓦 尔尼（俄罗斯反对派领导人），这是一种非常有效的方法。”他还补充道，俄罗斯联邦安全局发布的一份声明和其他文件显示，该局和俄罗斯内政部均要求部署两种 类型的无人机在冬奥会期间执行监控任务，并且还会在索契市内安装一个庞大的闭路电视网络。
“这些措施全部加在一起，就可能成为奥运会历史上最全面的监控网络了。”索尔达托夫说，由于深度监控如此广泛，致使美国国务院建议国民“（前往索契观看冬奥会时）最好把你的智能手机或者笔记本电脑放在家里，因为其中的数据将会遭到拦截。”
***目的是防范恐怖袭击？
表面上，俄罗斯当局在索契构建如此严密的 监控网络，其目的是保护索契在冬奥会期间免遭恐怖袭击。索契毗邻俄罗斯北高加索地区，那里冲突不断，活跃着不少伊斯兰分裂主义叛乱分子。其中，一个名为多 库•乌马罗夫的叛军首领近年来在莫斯科制造了多起自杀式爆炸袭击事件，他呼吁其支持者攻击索契冬奥会。今年8月，俄罗斯总统普京签署一项法令，在索契市内 设立多个禁区，禁止人们冬奥会期间在这些区域内举行公共示威。
本周早些时候，俄罗斯联邦安全局一名发言人告诉媒体，与2012年伦敦夏季奥运会相比，2014年索契冬奥会的安全措施“不具侵入性”。然而，索尔达托夫指出，俄罗斯当局采取安全措施的本质，以及关键人员任命，透露出截然不同的意思。
索尔达托夫和博罗甘发现，俄罗斯联邦安全 局自2010年起开始升级SORM系统，以确保其能够应付冬奥会期间观赛游客带来的额外通讯流量。SORM系统是俄罗斯官方对互联网信息进行监控的网络监 控系统，要求所有电话和互联网服务供应商必须强制安装。安装之后，俄罗斯联邦安全局能够在服务商不知情的情况下获取数据，这意味着所有电话和网络通讯数据 都可被记录在案。
此外，索契冬奥会的安全保卫工作主管由奥列格•索罗莫洛托夫担任，此人是一名顶尖的间谍捕手而非反恐专家。“综上所述，在我看来，这些人（俄罗斯当局）仍旧认为，索契冬奥会面临的主要威胁不是来自北高加索，而是来自境外，”索尔达托夫说。
截至目前，俄罗斯联邦安全局尚未对上述报道作出回应。